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1. Introduction 
 
Y. Zheng introduced a new cryptographic primitive Signcryption in [12], which combines 
digital signature function with a symmetric key encryption algorithm. A digital signature is 
used for authentication of message and an encryption scheme is used for the confidentiality 
of messages. A signcryption offers these two properties at the same time and more 
efficiently. Computational cost in Signcryption is considerably reduced as compared to 
signature-then-encryption process. 
 
The concept of blind signature was introduced by D Chaum [2].Blind signature schemes [4–
6, 9] are protocols that guarantee anonymity of the participants. A blind signature scheme 
allows a user to obtain a valid signature for a message from a signer, without signer’s seeing 
the message or its signature. Though it can be verified that the signature is genuine but 
signer can not link the message signature pair to that instance of signing protocol which has 
led to this pair. It realizes secure electronic payment systems and protect customer’s privacy 
as well as participants’ anonymity. 
 
In this paper, we present a Blind Signcryption Scheme that combines the functionality of 
blind signature and encryption. The Blind Signcryption ensures anonymity, untracebility and 
unlinkability. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
 
A digital signcryption scheme [12, 13] is cryptographic method that fulfills both, the function 
of secure encryption and digital signature but at a cost lower than that of signature-then-
encryption. In cryptographic notation signcryption consists of a pair of polynomial time 
algorithms (S, U), where S is the signcryption algorithm, while U is unsigncryption algorithm. 
S is in general probabilistic, but U is most likely to be deterministic. (S, U) satisfies the 
following conditions [3]. 
Unique unsigncryptability - The signcryption algorithm S takes the given message m as 
input and outputs a ciphertext c. On input c the unsigncryption algorithm U recovers the 
original message uniquely. 
Security - The protocol SC = (S, U) satisfies simultaneously, the property of digital signature 
and encryption both. In other words ensures the following: 
 
Unforgeability - It is computationally infeasible for an adaptive attacker to 
masquerade the signer and create a signcrypted text. 
 
Nonrepudiation - Signer cannot deny that he/she is the originator of the signcrypted 
text with the recipient. In case of dispute it is feasible for some third party to decide it. 
 
Confidentiality - No third party can obtain any information about message contents 
from the content of a signcrypted text. 
 
Efficiency - The computational cost of SC and communication overhead of the scheme is 
smaller than required by signature-than-encryption process.  
 
Before introducing our Blind Signcryption Scheme, we discuss in the following subsections 
shortened digital signature, Zheng’ s signcryption scheme. 
 
2.1 Shortened Digital Signature standard 
As the name suggests it is a shortened form of DSS [7]. Zheng used it for construction of an 
efficient signcryption scheme. 
 
The parameters used in scheme are: 
− p: a large prime 
− q: a large prime factor of (p -1) 
− g: an element of Zp* of order q 
− h(.): a one way secure hash function 
− xA: signer A’s private key 
− yA: signer A’s public key, where yA = g
xA
 mod p 
Signature Generation 
To sign a message m the Signer A randomly chooses a number k ∈ Zp* and  computes  
r = h(gk mod p, m)                                             (1) 
and              s = kr + xA  mod q.                                              (2) 
 
A sends (m, r, s) to B as signature tuple. 
Signature Verification  
For verification of signature, the verifier B computes Verifier B computes  
K = (y. gr )s mod p                                             (3) 
and checks if h(K, m) = r is true. 
 
 
2.2 Zheng ’s Signcryption Scheme 
Y Zheng [12] proposed the following scheme. In this scheme signer parameters are: 
       p, q, g, h(.), g  are same as previously defined 
  KH: a keyed one way hash function 
  (E, D):  the encryption and decryption function of symmetric key cipher. 
  (xB, , yB):  B’s private and public key 
 
Signcryption process 
A carries out the following steps to send to a message m to B –  
1. Choose k ∈ Zq*. let K = h(ybk mod p) and splits K in to K1 and K2 of appropriate length. 
2. r = KHK2 (m, bind_info) where bind_info is an identity of receiver B. 
3. S = kr + xA  mod q 
4. c = EK1(m) and sends to B signcrypted  text (c, r, s). 
 Unsigncryption 
B computes the following operation to recover m from (c, r, s). 
1. Calculates K = h[(y. gr )s xB mod p ] and splits K into K1 and K2 
2. Computes m = DK1(c) and check if  KHK2 (m, bind_info) =  r to accept a valid original 
message. 
 
2.3 Blind Signature 
Let V denotes A’s view of an execution of the signing protocol and let (m, Sig(m)) denotes 
the message signature pair generated in that particular execution. Then a signature scheme 
is called Blind if A’s view and signature pair (m, Sig(m)) are statistically independent. 
 
3. Our Contribution 
 
3.1 Modified Blind Signature using SDSS 
The following protocol is a blind version of SDSS. 
 
Signing on a message m 
1. A randomly chooses k~  ∈ Zq* and computes z = g k
~
 mod p 
2. If gcd(z, q) = 1. A sends z to B else goes back to 1. 
3. B checks if gcd(z, q) = 1 and proceed further. Else returns z to A. 
4. B randomly chooses u, α, β and computes 
  r  =  h(m, gu mod p)                                               (4) 
 T  =  zr . zβ · gα              (5) 
r  =  r + β               (6) 
5. B checks if gcd(r,  q) = 1. If yes he sends r  to A, else goes back to 4 otherwise. 
6. A computes s = xA +r ·k  mod q and forwards it to B. 
7. B computes s =  u
 r +s + α
  mod q 
 
Verification of signature  
Verifier C computes K = (yA ·T·gr)s mod p and checks if h(m, K) =  r is true. 
 
Theorem 1. The pair (r, s) is a valid signature of message m for the SDSS and the above 
protocol is a blind signature scheme. 
 
Proof. The validity of the signature pair c may be easily shown as follows  
(gr.yA.T )s 
= (gr.gxA.zr.z β.gα )s mod p 
= (gr+xA.zr+β.gα )s mod p 
= (gr+xA.gr .(r+β).gα)s mod p 
= gu mod p = K 
It follows h(m, K) = r. Thus (r, s) is a valid signature of m. In order to prove that above 
protocol is blind we have to show that any given view V and a valid message signature tuple 
(m, Sig(m)) with r = 0 mod q, there exist a unique pair of blinding factors α and β. Because α 
and β are chosen randomly, the blindness of the scheme follows – 
 
If (r, s) is a signature tuple for the message m, generated during execution of the protocol 
with view V consisting of k, z = gk mod p, r  and s = xA + r · k  mod q. 
Then the following equation must hold for α and β. 
 
T  =  zr . zβ · gα 
r  =  r + β 
s =  
u
 r +s + α
  mod q 
because z, r, r, are relatively prime to q, the blinding factors α and β are uniquely 
determined by the first two equations: 
α = s−1.u − (r +s) mod q 
β = r − r 
By substituting s = xA + r · k  mod q, we obtain   
zr · zβ · gα   = g (¯ k.r+k.β) + α 
= gk.r+k.( r − r ) + s−1.u − (r +s) 
= gk. r + s−1.u − r − s 
= gk. r−s  gs−1.u  gr 
= g−xA  gs−1 u  gr 
= gs−1.u− xA + r 
= gs−1.u− g - xA g r 
= gs−1.u yA−1 g r = T mod p 
it gives (yA.T.gr)s = gs−1.u.s = gu = K. which is true. 
 
An interesting characteristic of above stated shortened blind signature scheme is that gu mod 
p is not explicitly contained in a signature (r, s). It can be recovered from the pair (r, s) and 
other public parameters. This motivates us to construct a blind signcryption scheme in way 
similar to Zheng’s signcryption. 
 
3.2 Blind Signcryption 
In this section we propose our blind Signcryption scheme. In describing our scheme, we will 
use E and D to denote the encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm. Encrypting a 
message with a key K is indicated as EK(m) while decrypting a ciphertext is denoted by 
DK(m). In addition we use KHK(m) to denote hashing a message m with a keyed hash 
algorithm KH under a key K. 
 
Assume that A has chosen a secret key xA from [1, 2, ..., q] and made public her matching 
public key yA = gxA mod p. Similarly B and C’s secret keys are xB and xC, and their respective 
public keys are yB = gxB mod p and yC = gxC mod p. 
 
The signcryption and unsigncryption protocol using a modified blind signature are remarkably 
simple. To blindly signcrypt a message m we adopt the following protocol: 
 
Signcryption Process 
1. A randomly chooses k~  ∈Zq* and computes z = g k
~
 mod p 
2. A sends z  to B if gcd(z, q) = 1 else he goes back to step1 
3. B randomly chooses α, β and computes  T = zr zβgα     
4. Chooses u ∈Zq* . Let K = h(yCk mod p) and splits K in to K1 and K2 of appropriate length. 
5. B computes r = r + β, c = EK1(m) and  r = KHK2 (m, bind_info) where bind_info is an 
identity of receiver C, and sends r to A. 
6. A signs r = x +rk and sendss  to B. 
7. B computes  s = u
 r +s + α 
   (mod q) and  sends to C the signcrypted  text (c, r, s). 
 
Unsigncryption 
C computes the following operation to recover the original message m from (c, r, s). 
1. Calculate K = h[(y.T. gr )s xC mod p ] 
2. Split K into K1 and K2 
3. m = DK1(c) 
4. Check if  KHK2 (m, bind_info) =  r to accept m as a valid original message. 
 
4. Security Analysis 
 
The blind signcryption scheme satisfies all the properties for an authenticated encryption. It 
provides anonymity, untracebility of participants, unlinkablity, confidentiality, authentication 
and non-repudiation. anonymity, untracebility of participants and unlinkablity are the 
properties which are due blindness of the protocol. This may be similar to theorem 1 
discussed in section 3.1 Confidentiality is achieved by using encryption algorithm EK. The 
authentication is achieved by having the signature for which sender uses it’s private key to 
signcrypt. In case of dispute, the zero knowledge proof protocol between the third party judge 
and recipient, may settle their problem. That is, Signer can not deny that he made that 
signcrypted text with the recipient. Most of the security discussion is similar to the original 
schemes [13, 3, 8, 14]. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Blind signature schemes enable a useful protocol that guarantee the anonymity of the 
participants while Signcryption offers authentication of message and confidentiality of 
messages at the same time and more efficiently. In this paper, we present a blind 
signcryption scheme that combines the functionality of blind signature and signcryption. This 
blind Signcryption is useful for applications that are based on anonymity untracebility and 
unlinkability.  
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